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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030347-CA
v.
DARIUS MALAGA,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his convictions for murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated
robbery, and conspiracy to commit murder. This Court has pour-over jurisdiction
pursuant § 78-2a-3(2)G) (Supp. 2002).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Does defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the
reasonable doubt jury instruction fail where it rests on recently
overturned case law?

ILA. Was defense counsel ineffective in not challenging the jury instructions
based on accomplice liability where the State did not rely on
accomplice liability in convicting defendant?
ILB. Was defense counsel ineffective in not challenging the murder elements
instruction where the instruction included all theories relied upon by
the State and the extra element only added to the State's burden?
ILC. Was defense counsel ineffective in not challenging the conspiracy
instructions where, taken together, they adequately instructed the jury
as to the elements of that crime?

III.

Was defense counsel ineffective in not challenging the instruction
concerning co-defendant's testimony where the instruction was a
proper statement of the law?

IV.

Was defense counsel ineffective in not challenging the causation
instruction where defendant never argued that an intervening cause led
to Amy Tavey's death?

V.

Was defense counsel ineffective in not challenging the flight instruction
where defendant has not shown that counsel's decision was anything
other than a sound strategic one?
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal

presents a question of law. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162.1
VI.

Did the trial court err in not making findings concerning mitigating
factors before imposing the maximum mandatory sentence for
aggravated kidnapping where the record supports the court's lack of
findings?
A trial court's sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State

v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, \ 27, 55 P.3d 1131, cert denied, 63 P.3d 104 (Utah 2003).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A:
United States Const. Amend VI;
Utah Const, Art. I, § 12.

defendant asks this Court to consider each of his jury instruction challenges for
plain error and manifest injustice, as well as for ineffective assistance of counsel. See
Aplt. Br. at 44-49. However, defendant affirmatively approved of the instructions at trial
(R. 459:982). Thus, he waived any plain error or manifest injustice challenges to those
instructions on appeal. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 62, 114 P.3d 551 ("A jury
instruction may not be assigned as error, even if such instruction would otherwise
constitute manifest injustice, 'if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively
represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction.'") (quoting
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54, 70 P.3d 111).
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of murder, a first degree felony, for the
death of Amy Tavey, and one count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated
robbery, both first degree felonies, and conspiracy to commit murder, a second degree
felony, for crimes against Keith Williams (R. 76-79). After bindover, his case was
consolidated with that of co-defendant Silia Olive (R. 142-45; R. 450:363).
After a six-day jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 411-12).
Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of five years to live for murder, fifteen
years to life for aggravated kidnapping, nine years to life for aggravated robbery, and one
to fifteen years for conspiracy (R. 420-21). Defendant timely appealed (R. 425-26).
The supreme court transferred the matter to this Court for disposition (R. 429).
The trial court then supplemented the record with an order addressing proposed jury
instructions (R. 615-91). After defendant filed his opening brief, briefing was stayed
pending a decision by the supreme court on an issue that could have been determinative
of defendant's appeal. On June 7, 2005, the supreme court issued its decision in State v.
Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305. The briefing schedule in this case was then reset.
STATEMENT OF FACTS2
On May 3, 2002, co-defendant Silia Olive convinced her girlfriend to lure Keith
Williams, a drug associate, to Olive's apartment so that Olive's friends, including

2

The facts are set forth in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 2, 10 P.3d 346.
3

defendant, could assault and kidnap him (R. 454:145-46, 213-14; R. 455:280). By the
end of the night, Williams had been beaten up, robbed, tied up with duct tape, and forced
into the trunk of his own car (R. 454:158; R. 455:376-78, 381, 387). Williams's
girlfriend, Amy Tavey, who unexpectedly accompanied Williams to the apartment, had
been kidnapped and murdered, her body dumped into the Jordan River (R. 454:150, 15859, 166-67, 199, 210, 212, 236-37; R. 455:329, 334-35, 362, 485). According to Olive, it
was defendant's idea to lure Williams over to Olive's apartment (R. 457:823).
On May 3, 2002, Amanda Miller was staying at the home of Olive's cousins, the
Laos. Olive called Amanda for a favor and arranged to pick up Amanda later that
evening (R. 454:140-42). Sometime after dark, Olive picked up Amanda. Olive was
driving her boyfriend's white Buick. Defendant and Tony Pita were with her (R.
454:137, 142-43; R. 457: 824). The four then drove to Olive's apartment, where they met
up with Olive's boyfriend, Anthony Lavulo, and with William Raymond Wallace
("Raymond") and Marguerite Lao ("Liti") (R. 454:144-145; R. 457: 826, 828).
Once in the apartment, Olive asked Amanda to call Keith Williams ("Boss"), a
drug dealer from whom Olive and Amanda had previously purchased crystal
methamphetamine (R. 454:145-46, 214). Olive told Amanda to convince him to come
over because they were planning to beat up and kidnap him (R. 454:146, 213; R.
455:280). Defendant, Anthony, and Raymond walked in and out of the room as Olive
told Amanda the plan (R. 454:214). After four or five attempts, Amanda was finally able
to talk with Boss, who said he would come over as soon as he could (R. 454:148, 193).
4

Shortly before Boss arrived, he called and talked with Olive (R. 454:150). Boss
informed Olive that his girlfriend, Amy Tavey, was with him and asked if it was okay for
Amy to come up to the apartment with him (R. 454:150; R. 455:362). Olive told Boss to
"go ahead and bring her" (R. 454:151; R. 455:363-64).
When Boss arrived, he parked in the back of the building because he was not on
good terms with "Liz," a drug dealer who sometimes stayed with Olive (R. 455:366).
According to Boss, Liz had started a false rumor that he had shot at her (R. 455:367).
After parking, Boss and Amy got out of the car and started walking towards
Olive's apartment. Boss gave Amy his leather USA jacket to wear because she did not
have a jacket (R. 455:368). As Boss and Amy came around the corner of the building,
they saw Olive sitting on her third-floor patio smoking a cigarette. Boss joked with Olive
briefly, and then walked with Amy up the stairs to Olive's apartment (R. 455:371-72).
When Boss tried to open the door to the apartment, he was surprised to find the
door locked. On prior occasions, the door had always been unlocked. Boss knocked and
waited. A minute later, Olive answered the door, smiled and backed up (R. 455:372-73;
R. 457:840).
When Boss and Amy entered the apartment, "the smile just dropped from [Olive's]
face" as she looked over Boss's shoulder (R. 454:156; R. 455:374). When Boss turned to
see what Olive was looking at, defendant hit him over the head with a "silver-looking
gun" (R. 455:310, 375; R. 457:842). Boss's head started to bleed, and he fell to the floor.

5

Immediately, the other males joined defendant in beating Boss (R. 454:157-58; R.
455:376-78; R. 457:844-45).
Defendant and Raymond then took Boss's wallet, necklace, ring, cell phone,
watch, and car keys. Afterwards, defendant pulled Boss's black beanie over his eyes,
duct taped his hands behind his back, and placed a strip of tape over his mouth.
Defendant then pulled out his gun, placed it at the back of Boss's head, and took him to
the bathroom (R. 455:379, 381, 383). Defendant told Boss that he "was going to f-k me
in my ass," to "shut the f-k up," and that "he was going to kill me." Defendant said this
was happening because he had heard that Boss had shot at Liz (R. 455:378-80, 411).
Boss tried unsuccessfully to push Amy out the door (R. 455:378). When Amy's
mouth dropped open, Olive came over and placed her hand over Amy's mouth (R.
454:158, 199). Boss did not see Amy again (R. 455:383).
Olive led Amy down the narrow hallway back to Olive's bedroom (R. 454:159; R.
455:470; R. 457: 848). As Olive led Amy away, Amy was crying. When Amy asked
Olive not to hurt her, Olive "just told her to be quiet" (R. 455:470-71; R. 457: 858).
Soon, defendant called on Olive to help find Boss's car, which they then parked at
the bottom of the stairs leading to the apartment (R. 454:219; R. 457:853). A few
minutes later, defendant and Raymond picked Boss up and led him out of the apartment
and down the stairs while defendant held a gun to Boss's back. Defendant then ordered
Boss to get into the trunk of his car (R. 455:386-88).

6

When Olive re-entered her bedroom at about the same time, Amy was no longer
wearing her leather jacket. Olive got a red "hoodie" out of her closet and told Amy to put
it on (R. 454:161, 210; R. 457:860).3 Olive then told Amy to cover her head and face
with the hood of the hoodie and led Amy out of the apartment to Anthony's white Buick
(R. 454:166-67, 210, 212). Olive, Amanda, and Anthony got into the front seat of the car;
Amy was placed in the back seat between Liti on her right and a pile of clothes on her
left. Amy was still crying (R. 454:167; R. 455: 473-75).
Before leaving, Olive asked defendant, who was driving Boss's car, to follow her
because her license plates were expired and she did not want to get pulled over by the
police (R. 457:867-68). Olive left the apartment complex and headed toward the Lao
residence near the Jordan River (R. 454:168; R. 457:871). Defendant pulled up closely
behind Olive's car and followed (R. 454:168). Soon thereafter, Boss was able to free his
hands from the duct tape, pop the trunk, and escape undetected (R. 455:390-91).
About fifteen minutes later, Olive's and Boss's cars arrived at the Lao house (R.
454:168). During the ride, Olive told Amy that "if she kept her mouth shut then nothing
was going to happen." Amy remained silent (R, 454:236-38; R. 455:475-76).
As the two cars approached the Lao house, defendant pulled up next to Olive, told
her to park, and drove off. Olive parked the car and got out briefly to let Amanda out (R.
454:169; R. 455:477; R. 457:872). Amanda said good-bye and then walked into the Lao

;

A "hoodie" is a sweatshirt with a hood (R. 454:161-62).
7

house (R. 454:169-70; R. 456:510). Everyone else stayed in the car (R. 455:476,478).
About 30 minutes later, Boss's car returned (R. 455:478; R. 457:882).
Defendant got out of Boss's car and approached Olive's (R. 455:481; R. 457:885).
Liti got out to meet defendant and asked if he was okay because he seemed very mad (R.
455:482; R. 456:540). Ignoring the question, defendant continued to walk toward Olive's
car and asked, "Where's the girl?" Liti told him that Amy was in the car (R. 455: 482).
Defendant opened Olive's rear door, pulled Amy out of the car, and led her away
holding the back of her arm. Liti got back into Olive's car with Olive and Anthony. A
few minutes later, all three heard multiple gunshots. Liti just shook her head (R. 455:48384; R. 457:887-90). Inside the house, Amanda also heard the gunshots (R. 454:172, 23536). She looked out the window and saw the white Buick driving away (R. 454:232-34;
R. 456:533-34).
Amy's body was found floating on her left side next to the north shore of the
Jordan River (R. 455:329). An autopsy revealed that she had been murdered by gunshots
fired into her back that penetrated her heart and lungs. (R. 455:334-45).
At about 4 a.m. that morning, defendant and Raymond arrived at the home of
Loleni Tuaone, a friend, in Boss's car. Tuaone was there with his girlfriend, Kelli
Kershaw, and two other friends (R. 456:565-68). Raymond asked for help in disposing of
the car. Kelli drove her friend's car, with Raymond as a passenger. Defendant drove
Boss's car (R. 456:569-71). Defendant dropped the car off in a field around 3200 West.

8

Raymond spent the night at Tuaone's; defendant left (R. 456:573). When Boss's car was
located later that day, it looked as if someone had tried to light it on fire (R. 456:577-78).
The next morning, Tuaone saw defendant again. Defendant told Tuaone that he
had killed a girl the night before by a river in the Glendale area. Defendant said he had
put the girl on her knees, shot her, and then rolled her into the river (R. 456:612, 614-16).
After the murder, Amanda spent a night with defendant at a motel in Salt Lake
City (R. 454:174-75). During the stay, Amanda saw a handgun under a pillow (R.
454:175). It was the same handgun Amanda had seen at Olive's apartment on the night
of the murder (R. 454:179).
Meanwhile, Raymond called a friend, Brieanna Stell, to take him to a motel (R.
456:591-92). Brieanna took him to a motel in Salt Lake City, where they met up with
Amanda and defendant. The party then picked up Tony Pita and dropped off Amanda at
the Lao house before driving to Las Vegas (R. 456:593-95). Brieanna recalled that
defendant was leaving town because he was wanted by the police. When the party arrived
in Las Vegas, Brieanna dropped the three men off at Raymond's cousin's house (R.
456:602). Brieanna then returned to Salt Lake (R. 456:598-99).
Olive and Anthony were arrested in Bountiful, Utah on May 5, 2002 (R. 457:715).
Defendant, Tony, and Raymond were arrested in Las Vegas on or about May 13 (R.
456:595, 637-41). In a statement given to police after he was arrested, defendant
admitted that he had been drinking on the night of the murder (R. 456:649). He also

9

admitted assaulting Boss and then taping him up and putting him in the trunk. He also
admitted that he was near the Jordan River that night (R. 456:643, 650-53, 656).
Amy's purse and leather jacket were found in Olive's apartment (R. 455:450, 45253). The gun used to kill Amy was found in the Las Vegas apartment in which defendant,
Raymond, and Tony had stayed (R. 457:686-87, 690-92, 759-62).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue I. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not challenging
the reasonable doubt jury instruction. However, in making his claim, defendant relies on
case law that has recently been overturned. Because defendant's claim does not survive
under the new law, his claim fails.
Issue II.A. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not
challenging various elements instructions because the instructions failed to address
accomplice liability even though that theory was originally included in the information.
Defendant also claims counsel should have challenged the instructions defining
accomplice liability as misleading. Defendant's first claim fails because nothing requires
that jury instructions include all the theories alleged in the information. His second claim
fails because the State did not rely on accomplice liability in convicting him.
Issue ILB. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not
challenging the murder elements instruction because the instruction failed to include the
elements for depraved indifference murder even though that theory was originally
included in the information. Defendant also claims counsel should have challenged a jury
10

instruction defining "grave risk of death" as improper. Finally, defendant claims counsel
should have challenged the murder elements instruction because it included an element
not actually required.
Defendant's first contention fails because nothing requires that jury instructions
include all the theories alleged in the information. Defendant's second contention fails
because the "grave risk of death" instruction was superfluous to defendant's murder
conviction. Defendant's third contention fails because the inclusion of an additional
element in the murder charge merely added to the State's burden of proof.
Issue ILC. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not
challenging the conspiracy instructions because no single instruction contained both the
elements of the crime and the provision that the State had to prove those elements beyond
a reasonable doubt. Defendant's claim fails because the two conspiracy instructions, read
together, adequately informed the jury of the law.
Issue III. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not
challenging a jury instruction directing the jury to consider co-defendant Olive's
testimony as it would any other witness's even though Olive was an accomplice and
informant. Defendant's claim fails because the instructions as a whole were adequate to
inform the jury that it should receive Olive's testimony with caution.
Issue IV. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not
challenging the murder causation statute as inadequately defining "intervening cause."
Defendant's claim fails, however, because the instruction was more favorable to
11

defendant than the one he now proposes and because the instruction was adequate for
defendant to present his defense.
Issue V. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not challenging
the flight instruction because it did not contain specific language suggested in Utah case
law. Defendant's claim fails because the instruction was sufficient for defendant to
present his defense.
Issue VI. Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in imposing
the maximum minimum mandatory sentence for aggravated kidnapping without making
specific findings that defendant's age and familial support were mitigating factors.
Alternatively, defendant claims his counsel was ineffective in not asking the court to find
those factors as mitigating. However, the record does not establish either of these factors
as necessarily mitigating. Under such circumstances, the trial court did not err, let alone
obviously err, in not finding those factors in mitigation; nor was defense counsel
ineffective in not presenting them.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
CLAIM BASED ON THE REASONABLE DOUBT JURY
INSTRUCTION FAILS WHERE IT RESTS ON RECENTLY
OVERTURNED CASE LAW
Defendant claims the trial court committed plain error in giving the reasonable

doubt jury instruction in this case. See Aplt. Br. at 27, 44-49. Alternatively, defendant
claims his trial counsel was ineffective in not challenging the instruction. See id.
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Defendant claims that the instruction violated State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah
1997), "because [it] did not contain the essential phrase 'proof beyond reasonable doubt
obviates all reasonable doubt5 and did contain . . . impermissible language indicating that
reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible." Id. at 27. Defendant's claim fails
because Robertson no longer governs.
As previously stated, see fn. 1 supra, although defendant asks this Court to each of
his jury instruction challenges for plain error and manifest injustice, as well as for
ineffective assistance of counsel, see Aplt. Br. at 44-49, defendant affirmatively approved
of the instructions at trial (R. 459:982). Thus, he waived any plain error or manifest
injustice challenges to those instructions on appeal. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ^f
62,114 P.3d 551 ("A jury instruction may not be assigned as error, even if such
instruction would otherwise constitute manifest injustice, 'if counsel, either by statement
or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury
instruction."') (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, TJ 54, 70 P.3d 111).
The following reasonable doubt instruction was given in this case:
You are instructed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
that degree of proof that satisfies the mind and convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.
A reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible, fanciful or
imaginary, because most everything relating to human affairs is open
to some possible doubt. But a reasonable doubt is one which is real
and substantial: it is a doubt based upon reason and one which
reasonable men and women would have upon a consideration of all
of the evidence. It must arise from the evidence or the lack of
evidence in the case.
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(R. 398; Instr. 60)
A.

Ineffective assistance claims cannot be based on overturned law.

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must show
both that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard
of reasonable professional judgment" and that "counsel's deficient performance was
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT
76, Tf 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).
However, when an ineffectiveness claim relies on recently overturned law, this Court
need not consider whether defendant has established the first prong of the Strickland test
because defendant cannot demonstrate the second prong. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506
U.S. 364, 369-72 (1993); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 392 (2000).
In Fretwell, Fretwell argued that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to
the state's use of an element of the crime as an aggravating factor at Fretwell's capital
murder sentencing hearing where, at the time of the hearing, a federal circuit court
decision in that jurisdiction directly supported Fretwell's claim. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at
364, 367. Although the state courts rejected Fretwell's claim, the federal district court
granted Fretwell habeas relief, concluding that his trial counsel "'had a duty to be aware
of all law relevant to death penalty cases'" and his "failure to make the . . . objection
amounted to prejudice under Strickland." Id. at 367. (citation omitted). The federal court
of appeals affirmed, "even though it had two years earlier overruled its [prior] decision
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. . . in light of [an intervening Supreme Court] decision." Id. at 368. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Id.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court considered "whether counsel's failure to make an
objection in a state criminal sentencing proceeding—an objection that would have been
supported by a decision which subsequently was overruled—constitutes 'prejudice'
within the meaning of our decision in Strickland." Id. at 366. The Court held that it did
not. Id. In explaining its holding, the Court noted that "the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel exists 'in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.'" Id. at 368
(citation omitted). Thus, "the right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not
for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a
fair trial." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court held:
Because the result of the sentencing proceeding in this case
was rendered neither unreliable nor fundamentally unfair as a
result of counsel's failure to make the objection, we answer
the question in the negative. To hold otherwise would grant
criminal defendants a windfall to which they are not entitled.
Id. at 366. In other words, an ineffectiveness claim based on the failure to raise an
objection that has since been deemed invalid fails because defendant cannot show that
"the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable," i.e., that he was
prejudiced by counsel's performance. Id. at 369-70, 372. To hold otherwise would
"grant the defendant a windfall to which the law"—which has now presumably been
correctly decided—"does not entitle him." Id. at 370.
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B.

Robertson, on which defendant relies, has been overturned by Reyes.

In State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, ^j 25 n.l 1, 61 P.3d 1000, the Utah Supreme Court identified a
three-part test "for reviewing the appropriateness of a reasonable doubt instruction."
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof
must obviate all reasonable doubt." Second, the instruction should
not state that a reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or
control a person in the more weighty affairs of life," as such an
instruction tends to trivialize the decision of whether to convict.
Third, "it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not
merely a possibility," although it is permissible to instruct that a
"fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof
beyond a reasonable doubt."
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (citations omitted).
The supreme court, however, revisited Robertson in State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33,
116 P.3d 305. Reyes claimed that the reasonable doubt instruction given in his case "was
improper" because it "fail[ed] to . . . 'specifically state that the State's proof must obviate
all reasonable doubt' and [because it] improperly] inclu[ded] . . . the phrase 'doubt which
is merely possible.'" Id. at \ 3. The court rejected Reyes's claims. Id. at \ 33, 35.
The court first concluded that Robertson's "obviate all reasonable doubt"
requirement was "both linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect." Id. at ^ 26. It was
"linguistically opaque" because it "require[d] jurors to identify doubts and assess whether
the evidence overcomes them." Id. It was "conceptually suspect" because, by requiring
the jury to either "articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it" instead of being able to
rely on some "unarticulated conviction that the State has failed to meet its burden of
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proof," it "permitted] the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are
sufficiently defined," thereby "improperly diminish[ing] the State's burden" of proof. Id.
atffif27-28. The court, therefore, "expressly abandoned]" that Robertson requirement.
Id atf 30.
The court then addressed Robertson's statement that "'it is inappropriate to instruct
that a reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility.'" Id. atfflf7, 31-34. The court noted
that the "fundamental objection to excluding 'mere possibility' from eligibility for
consideration as reasonable doubt was that the term 'possibility,' standing alone, fails to
disclose its location on the continuum marked at its extremes by impossibility and
certainty." Id. at \ 31. The court "st[oo]d by this observation." Id.
However, nothing in that observation, "[]or the Robertson test it spawned outlawed
all references to 'possibilities' in defining reasonable doubt." Id. at ^ 32. Indeed,
Robertson itself "approv[ed] of language that 'fanciful or wholly speculative possibility
ought not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (citations and additional
quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[w]hen complemented by appropriate qualifying and
explanatory language, the use of the term 'mere possibility' in the definition of doubt
does not create a reasonable likelihood that the jury would apply an unconstitutionally
diminished standard of proof." Id. at ^f 33.
In Reyes's instruction, the court noted, "the exclusion of doubt which is 'merely
possible' from consideration . . . is followed by the explanatory phrase 'since everything
in human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.'" Id. (additional internal
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quotation marks omitted). Such explanatory language "effectively neutralizes the risk
that the reference to a 'mere possibility' will improperly lead a juror to apply a standard
of proof lesser than a reasonable doubt." Id. Thus, the trial court did not err in including
"mere possibility" language in the reasonable doubt instruction. Id.
The court revisited Robertson again in State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, % 21,

P.3d

. Cruz confirmed that, after Reyes, "the Robertson test is no longer in force." Id.
C.

Reyes defeats defendant's "obviate all reasonable doubt" claim.

Defendant claims that his counsel should have objected to the reasonable doubt
instruction in this case because it did not include the "obviate all reasonable doubt"
language required by Robertson. Aplt. Br. at 27. As discussed above, however, the
supreme court recently overturned Robertson on this very issue. See Reyes, 2005 UT 33,
Tf 30. Thus, defendant's claim fails under the Fretwell analysis. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at
372.
D.

Reyes defeats defendant's "mere possibility" claim.

Defendant claims that counsel should have objected to the reasonable doubt
instruction because it improperly included the "mere possibility" language proscribed by
Robertson. Aplt. Br. at 27. Again, however, Reyes defeats defendant's claim.
Under Reyes, an instruction may include "mere possibility" language so long as it
also includes "appropriate qualifying and explanatory language" that "neutralizes the risk
that the reference to a 'mere possibility' [would] improperly lead a juror to apply a
standard of proof lesser than a reasonable doubt." Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at \ 33. In this
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case, the "mere possibility" language in the reasonable doubt instruction was qualified by
the following language: "A reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible, fanciful or
imaginary, because most everything relating to human affairs is open so some possible
doubt" (R. 398). This language is essentially identical to that upheld in Reyes. See Reyes,
2005 UT 33,ffif32-33 (noting that Robertson itself "approved] of language that 'fanciful
or wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt5"
and that the Reyes instruction included "the explanatory phrase 'since everything in
human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt."). Thus, defendant's
reasonable doubt instruction claim fails.
II.A. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM ASSERTING
ERROR IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS BASED ON
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY FAILS WHERE THE STATE DID NOT
RELY ON ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY IN CONVICTING HIM
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in not challenging the elements
instructions as well as the instructions concerning accomplice liability. Aplt. Br. at 29-30,
44-49. Defendant claims the elements instructions were erroneous because, "[w]hile all
of the charges against Malaga were premised on accomplice liability, none of the
elements instructions . . . required the government to prove the elements of accomplice
liability." Id. at 29 (record citations omitted). He challenges the accomplice liability
instructions as incomplete and misleading. Id. Neither of defendant's claims have merit.
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1.

Proceedings below.

The information charged defendant with murder for the death of Amy Tavey and
with aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit murder for
crimes committed against Keith Williams (R. 76-79). Each of the four counts alleged that
"the defendant, DARIUS PENI MALAGA, a party to the offense" committed the crime
alleged (R. 76-77). Thus, each of the counts indicated that defendant could be found
liable either as a principal in the crime or as an accomplice (Id.).
At trial, however, the State never pursued defendant on the theory of accomplice
liability. Rather, it identified defendant as a principal in the crimes for which he was
charged. Thus, concerning Amy Tavey's death, the prosecutor stated in opening:
In the early hours of Saturday, May 4th of 2002, Darius Malaga
grabbed Amy Tavey from Silia Olive's car. He marched her down a
wooded pathway next to the Jordan River. He forced her to kneel on
the ground in front of him and he executed her. He rolled her body
into the river and fled the scene.
(R. 454:105, 112). Concerning the aggravated robbery charge, the prosecutor stated:
Darius swung the handgun and hit Keith in the back of the head.
Keith falls to the floor. And out from different places in the
apartment come Anthony Lavulo, Tony Pita and Raymond Wallace.
And they join Darius Malaga in beating Keith, in taking his
possessions and duct taping him and pulling his beanie over his head.
(R. 454:110). And, concerning the aggravated kidnapping and conspiracy to commit
murder charges, the prosecutor stated:

"Meanwhile,... Darius Malaga, Tony Pita,

Anthony Lavulo and Raymond Wallace . . . take Keith out to Keith's car

They put

him in the trunk of the car and tell him they are going to kill him" (R. 454:110-11).
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In closing, the prosecutor again emphasized the principal nature of defendant's
liability. Thus, the prosecutor argued that defendant was a direct participant in the
beating, robbing, and kidnapping of Boss (R. 459:991-92, 994-95,1012-13); that it was
defendant who told Boss that "he was going to die" (R. 459:995); and that it was
defendant who led Amy Tavey to the river and shot her (R. 459:998-99, 1002-03, 1009,
1012-13, 1081). The only reference to accomplice liability was in connection with codefendant Olive's crime of felony murder, when the prosecutor referred to the accomplice
liability instruction and argued that "Olive was a party to the aggravated robbery of Keith
Williams" (R. 549:1009-10).
At the end of trial, the jury received an elements instruction for each of the counts
listed in the information (R. 379, 382, 384, 388). Consistent with the State's theory of
principal liability, none of the instructions included the "party to the offense" language
originally included in the information (Id). Thus, none of them allowed the jury to
convict defendant based on accomplice liability (Id).4
However, Instruction 22 did provide the jury with the statutory definition of
accomplice liability because, the prosecutor argued in closing, such liability was relevant
to co-defendant Olive's charge of felony murder (R. 358; Instr. 22; R. 549:1009-10). As
requested by Olive's counsel, the jury was also instructed that "[m]ere presence at the

4

Although one of the instructions defining a lesser included offense did allude to
accomplice liability (R. 394; Instr. 56), defendant was not convicted of the lesser offense.
Thus, that jury instruction is not relevant to defendant's claim on appeal.
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scene of the crime and knowledge that a crime is being committed are not sufficient to
establish that the defendant aided and abetted the crime" (R. 351; Instr. 15; R. 633).
2.

Nothing requires that jury instructions include all the theories
alleged in the information.

Defendant claims that his counsel should have objected to the elements
instructions because they did not address accomplice liability. Aplt. Br. at 48. State v.
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170 (Utah App. 1992), and related cases defeat defendant's claim.
In Ellifritz, Ellifritz was charged with one count of aggravated sexual assault. 835
P.2d at 173. The information alleged that Ellifritz had committed the crime by "causing
bodily injury to T.M. 'in the course of a rape or attempted rape, or forcible sodomy.5" Id.
at 178 The jury instruction "use[d] the same wording found in the information except it
substitute^] the words 'forcible sexual abuse, or attempted forcible sexual abuse' in
place of 'forcible sodomy.'" Id. On appeal, Ellifritz claimed that "the trial court
commi[ted] reversible error when it presented a jury instruction on aggravated assault that
correctly stated the law but differed from the language in the information charging
defendant." Id. at 173-74. This Court rejected defendant's claim.
First, this Court noted that the information charging Ellifritz, in addition to
alleging the facts of the crime, also cited to the statute defining the crime. Id. at 178. It
then noted that the statute defining the crime identified forcible sexual abuse or attempted
forcible sexual abuse as predicate crimes. See id. at 178 n.7. Finally, the Court noted that
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allow amendment of an information any time
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before verdict so long as no different offense is charged and "the substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced." Id. at 178; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d) (allowing
amendment of information "at any time before verdict if no additional or different offense
is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.").
Given those facts, this Court held, any "alleged error in the jury instruction was not
prejudicial." Id. at 179. Rather, "[i]f defendant had objected to the deviation in language,
the information could easily have been amended to conform with the jury instruction."
Id.; see also State v. Pederson, 2005 UT App 98, f 4, 110 P.3d 164 ("A trial court need
not give jury instructions regarding elements unnecessary for the conviction of the
charged crime.") (citation omitted); Harris v. State, 830 So. 2d 681, 684 (Miss. App.
2002) (holding "it is not error for jury instructions to reflect a constructive amendment to
an indictment," especially where "jury instruction simply remove[s] language that was
unnecessary to prove the offense charged in the indictment").
Defendant's claim fails under this law. Simply stated, a reference to accomplice
liability in the information did not obligate the State to rely on that theory at trial. See
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 173-74, 178-79. Rather, where, as here, the State's sole theory of
defendant's liability at trial was as a principal, any accomplice liability language in the
information was surplusage "unnecessary to prove the offense-charged in the indictment."
Harris, 830 So. 2d at 684. The removal of that language from the jury instructions,
therefore, merely "reflects] a constructive amendment to [the information]." Id.
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Because the instructions were proper, defendant's counsel was not ineffective in not
challenging them. Thus defendant's claim fails.
3.

Where the instructions addressing accomplice liability were not
relevant to defendant's convictions, defense counsel was not
ineffective in not challenging them.

Defendant claims that his counsel should have challenged the jury instructions
defining accomplice liability as incomplete and misleading. Aplt. Br. at 29 (discussing
instructions 15 and 22). Because defendant was not convicted under a theory of
accomplice liability, however, he cannot show prejudice, even if the instructions were
erroneous. See State v. Pirela, 2003 UT App 39, f 25, 65 P.3d 307 ('"If it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,... that
course should be followed.'") (citation omitted).
The failure of counsel to object to jury instructions is prejudicial "only if the
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in
the verdict." State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22,ffi|20, 23, 20 P.3d 888 (affirming conviction
where trial court's refusal to instruct jury on lesser included offense, though error, did not
undermine confidence in verdict); see also State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, \ 23,
989 P.2d 503 ("Even if we find error in the jury instruction, 'we will not reverse [a]
defendant's conviction unless that error is harmful.'") (quoting State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d
988, 990 (Utah App. 1993)) (alteration in original).
No likelihood of a different outcome exists when the instruction, even if
erroneous, "simply did not apply to the facts of th[e] case." Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 991
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(holding that any error in instruction concerning one method of committing assault was
harmless where State's evidence clearly did not implicate that method); see also State v.
DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah App. 1987) (holding that error in accomplice liability
instruction was harmless where instruction "was superfluous and not the basis of'jury's
verdict); United States v. Glenn, 64 F.3d 706, 710 (D.C. 1995) (holding that erroneous
instruction did not prejudice defendant because only implicated co-defendant).
In such cases, there is "no real danger that [the defendant] would be convicted on
the basis of [the inapplicable instruction] or that the jury was confused or misled by the
instruction." United States v. Valencia, 907 F.2d 671, 688-89 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
failure to inform jury that instruction was relevant only to co-defendant was harmless
where defendant "does not contend that the government argued [that theory] as a theory
under which he might be found guilty").
Valencia is instructive. Valencia challenged the trial court's failure "to specify
that the aiding and abetting instruction applied only to [his co-defendant]." 907 F.2d at
689. Valencia argued that, "because the government's theory of the case was that [he]
was the principal (and, presumably, [his co-defendant] was the accomplice), there was no
one left for [defendant] to aid and abet." Id, The court rejected Valencia's claim
because, "[throughout the government's case, Mr. Valencia's conduct was portrayed as
that of a principal." Id. Thus, "the danger of Mr. Valencia's being convicted on the basis
of the aiding and abetting instruction was so remote that any error in not limiting this
instruction to co-defendant Martinez was harmless." Id.
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In this case, the State's only theory was that defendant acted as a principal in the
crimes charged (R. 454:105, 110-12, R. 459:991-92, 994-955, 998-99, 1002-03, 1009,
1012-13, 1081). Consistent with that theory, each of the elements instructions under
which defendant was convicted allowed his conviction only as a principal (R. 379, 382,
384, 388). Thus, defendant was not prejudiced by the accomplice liability instructions,
even if they were erroneous. See Valencia, 907 F.2d at 688-89; see also Tlnoco, 860 P.2d
at 991; DeAlo, 748 P.2d at 198. Therefore, defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails,
ILB. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM ASSERTING
ERROR IN THE MURDER INSTRUCTIONS FAILS WHERE THE
STATE DID NOT RELY ON A DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE
THEORY TO CONVICT DEFENDANT OF MURDER
Defendant claims that his counsel should have objected to the murder elements
instruction because it "omitted the element of depraved indifference, which was charged
in this case, and included the element of unlawfulness, which is not an element of the
murder charge." Aplt. Br. at 29-30. Defendant also claims that counsel should have
challenged an instruction improperly defining "'grave risk of death,' which is an element
of depraved indifference homicide." Id. at 30. Defendant's claims lack merit.
1.

Background.

Count I of the amended information filed against defendant alleged that he
[1] intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Amy Tavey;
[2] and/or intending to cause serious bodily injury to Amy Tavey,
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the
death of Amy Tavey; and/or [3] acting under circumstances
evidencing depraved indifference to human life, engaged in conduct
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which created a grave risk of death to Amy Tavey, and thereby
caused the death of Amy Tavey.
(Id). Thus, the information identified three different theories under which defendant
could be convicted. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(a), (b), (c) (Supp. 2002).
At trial, however, the State's sole theory of liability was that defendant
intentionally took Amy from Olive's car after Boss had escaped, that he intentionally took
her to the Jordan River, and that he intentionally shot her (R. 454:105, 112; R. 459:99899, 1002-03, 1009, 1012-13, 1081). Consistent with the State's theory, the murder
elements instruction provided that, to find defendant guilty, the jury had to find that he
caused Amy's death "intentionally or knowingly" or that, "intending to cause serious
bodily injury to another, he committed an act clearly dangerous to human life, which
acted to cause the death of Amy Tavey" (R. 379; Instr. 41). The instruction did not make
any reference to a "depraved indifference" theory or any "grave risk of death" (Id.).
Despite the murder elements instruction, the next instruction provided: "As used in
these instructions, 'grave risk of death' refers to the probability of the risk of death
greater than just a 'substantial and justifiable' risk. A cgrave risk of death' means a
highly likely probability that death will result from the risk that the defendant knowingly
creates" (R. 380; Instr. 42). However, no other instruction used the term "grave risk of
death" (R. 336-404).
Finally, the murder instruction required—contrary to the statutory definition—
proof that, when defendant committed the murder, he "did so unlawfully" (Id.).
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2.

Nothing requires that jury instructions include all the theories
alleged in the information.

As previously discussed, jury instructions are not erroneous merely because they
do not include all the theories originally charged in the information. See State v.
Pederson, 2005 UT App 98, \ 4, 110 P.3d 164; State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 178-79
(Utah App. 1992); Harris v. State, 830 So. 2d 681, 684 (Miss. App. 2002).
Here, the State at trial relied upon only two of the three murder theories originally
charged in the information. Because the State did not rely on the depraved indifference
theory originally charged, the trial court did not err in not including that theory in the
murder elements instruction. See Pederson, 2005 UT App 98, f 4; Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at
178-79; Harris, 830 So. 2d at 684. Nor was counsel ineffective in not challenging the
trial court's decision. Therefore, defendant's claim fails.
3.

Where the instruction defining "grave risk" was not relevant to
defendant's murder conviction, counsel was not ineffective in not
challenging it.

As previously discussed, a defendant is not prejudiced by an erroneous jury
instruction if there is "no real danger" that defendant was "convicted on the basis of [that
instruction] or that the jury was confused or misled by the instruction." United States v.
Valencia, 907 F.2d 671, 689 (7th Cir. 1990); see also State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988, 991
(Utah App. 1993); United States v. Glenn, 64 F.3d 706, 710 (D.C. 1995).
Here, defendant's information identified three statutory theories on which the
murder charges were brought (R. 76-79). One of those theories was that defendant
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caused Amy's death by depraved indifference (R. 76-79). The phrase "grave risk of
death" is part of the statutory definition of depraved indifference murder. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203(c); see also Aplt. Br. at 30.
However, defendant "does not contend that the government argued [depraved
indifference] as a theory under which he might be found guilty," Valencia, 907 F.2d at
689. Nor does he contend that the murder elements instruction allowed defendant to be
convicted under that theory. See Aplt. Br. at 30-31. Thus, defendant has not shown why,
as he claims, the "grave risk" instruction "muddied the waters" or "undoubtedly confused
the jurors regarding the State's burden of proof in obtaining the murder conviction." Id.
In fact, the grave risk instruction "simply did not apply to the facts of th[e] case."
Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 991. Thus, defendant was not prejudiced by the instruction, even if it
was erroneous. See Valencia, 907 F.2d at 688-89; see also Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 991;
DeAlo, 748 P.2d at 198. Consequently, counsel was not ineffective in not challenging it.
4.

Defense counsel was not ineffective in not objecting to the extra
element in the murder elements instruction where that extra
element increased the State's burden of proof.

Defendant claims his counsel was ineffective in not challenging the murder
elements instruction where it "included the element of unlawfulness, which is not an
element of the murder charge." Aplt. Br. at 29-30. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
A defendant is not prejudiced by incorrect jury instructions when the error
"'increased the State's burden by adding another element to be proved.'" State v. Carruth,
947 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Davis v. State, 916 P.2d 251, 260 (Okla. Ct.
29

Crim. App. 1996)), affd, 993 P.2d 869 (Utah 1999). Rather, "such an error actually
benefits the defendant." Davis, 916 P.2d at 260.
Defendant does not claim that the "unlawful" element of the murder charge
lessened the State's burden of proof. To the contrary, if anything, the additional element
increased the State's burden. Defendant's counsel, therefore, was not ineffective in not
challenging that additional element.
ILC. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM ASSERTING
ERROR IN THE CONSPIRACY INSTRUCTIONS FAILS WHERE
THE INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOLE ADEQUATELY
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THAT CRIME
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for not challenging the jury
instructions on conspiracy because the instructions "did not accurately instruct the jurors
on the elements of conspiracy, or inform them that a conspiracy conviction could not
enter until the government proved each element of that offense beyond a reasonable
doubt." Aplt. Br. at 31. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
"An accurate instruction upon the basic elements of the offense charged is
essential, and the failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error." State v. Laine, 618
P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Cf. State v.
Casey, 2003 UT 55, \ 46-50, 82 P.3d 1106 (holding error in elements instruction was
harmless). However, "[s]o long as the jury is informed what each element is and that
each must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the instructions taken as a whole may be
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adequate even though the essential elements are found in more than one instruction."
Laine, 618 P.2d at 33; see also State v. Tuckett, 2000 UT App 295, Tf 9, 13 P.3d 1060.
Here, the elements of conspiracy to commit murder were set out in two
instructions. Instruction 50 provided that, to convict defendant of conspiracy to commit
murder, the jury had to find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that, on or about May 4,2002,
he "conspired to intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Keith Williams" (R. 388;
Instr. 50). Instruction 51 then set out the statutory definition of conspiracy:
A person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending that
conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees with one or more
persons to engage in or cause the performance of the conduct and
any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy,
except where the offense is a capital felony, a felony against the
person, arson, burglary, or robbery, the overt act is not required for
the commission of conspiracy.
(R. 389; Instr. 51). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (Supp. 2001).
These instructions are essentially indistinguishable from those upheld in State v.
Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, 64 P.3d 1218. There, Hobbs claimed that his conviction for
aggravated robbery had to be reversed because the aggravated robbery jury instruction
"did not include a definition of robbery within it." Id. at 131. This Court rejected
Hobbs's claim because, although the aggravated robbeiy instruction—which outlined
those elements the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt—did not include a
definition of robbery within it, the very next instruction did. Id. Thus, "[r]ead as a whole
the instructions adequately defined [aggravated] robbery." Id.
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Here, instructions 50 and 51, read together, identified for the jury all the elements
that it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict defendant of conspiracy
to commit murder. See Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, \ 31. Therefore, defense counsel was
not ineffective in not challenging these instructions.
III.

DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM ASSERTING
ERROR IN THE INSTRUCTION CONCERNING CODEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY FAILS WHERE THE INSTRUCTION
WAS A PROPER STATEMENT OF THE LAW
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to a jury

instruction discussing co-defendant Olive's testimony. Defendant claims that, by
directing "the jurors to treat [Olive's] testimony as they would that of any other
witness's," the instruction "undercut [his] rights to confrontation and to defend against
the charges" because "Olive was not any other witness," but rather "was an accomplice"
and "informantf]." Aplt. Br. at 33-34. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
A.

Relevant instructions.

The jury was given four instructions relevant to defendant's claim. First, the jury
was given a general instruction concerning "the weight of the evidence, the credibility of
the witnesses and the facts" (R. 344; Instr. 8). Although indicating that "[t]here is no firm
rule the Court can give you for determining the truthfulness 8tnd credibility of witnesses,"
the instruction identified various factors the jury "may consider," including "the
witnesses' motive for testifying, if any, and of course, the interest or lack of interest the
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witness may have in the outcome of the case, and the extent to which, if any, such interest
may have affected or colored his or her testimony" (Id).
The next instruction addressed informant testimony. That instruction directed the
jury "that the testimony of an informer who provides evidence against a defendant at the
request of the government must be examined and weighed by you with greater care than
the testimony of an ordinary witness," and identified for jurors several factors they
"should consider" in determining the informer's credibility (R. 345; Instr. 9).
The next instruction addressed how the jury should regard a defendant's testimony:
You are instructed that the Defendant is a competent witness
in one's own behalf and the Defendant's testimony should be
received and given the same consideration as you give to that of any
other witness. The fact that the Defendant stands accused of a crime
is no evidence of guilt or innocence and is no reason for rejecting the
Defendant's testimony. You should weigh the Defendant's
testimony the same as you weigh the testimony of any other witness.
(R. 346; Instr. 10).
The final instruction provided that, "[i]n deciding whether to believe testimony
given by an accomplice, you should use greater care and caution than you do when
deciding whether to believe testimony given by an ordinary witness" (R. 355; Instr. 19).
The instruction warned that an accomplice's testimony "may be strongly influenced by
the hope or expectation that the prosecution will reward testimony that supports the
prosecution's case by granting the accomplice immunity or leniency" (Id.). It also
advised the jury to "bear in mind the accomplice's interest in minimizing the seriousness
of the crime and the significance of the accomplice's own role in its commission, [which]
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may show the inside knowledge about the details of the crime [that then allows the
accomplice] to construct plausible falsehoods about it" (Id.).
B.

The instructions as a whole allowed defendant to argue his case
to the jury.

Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in not objecting to instruction 10
because that instruction directed the jury to consider co-defendant Olive's testimony as it
would any other witness. See Aplt. Br. at 33. Defendant claims that the instruction
"undercut" his "rights to confrontation and to defend against the charges." Id.
In support of his claim, defendant cites numerous authorities recognizing a
defendant's "right to present his defense" and "to have the jury instructed clearly and
comprehensibly on his theory of the case." Aplt. Br. at 32, n.l 1. He also cites authorities
recognizing the appropriateness of accomplice and informant instructions where such
persons testify for the State and either the testimony by such persons is uncorroborated or
the witnesses receive some benefit for their testimony. See id. at 33 n.12. However, none
of the authorities cited by defendant address, let alone directly support, his claims that an
instruction like that given here concerning a co-defendant testimony violates a
defendant's rights to confrontation and to present a defense.
Nor has the State found any such authority. To the contrary, the authority found by
the State tends to support the instructions given in this case. See Wimberly v. State, 423
S.E.2d 728, 729 (Ga. App. 1992) ("[I]f [a] co-defendant appears as a witness at trial, he
may testify against his co-defendant or co-conspirator and such testimony is to be treated
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as all other evidence."); see also People v. Alvarez, 926 P.2d 365, 403-04 & n.23 (Cal.
1996) (approving instructions that told jury both that "testimony of a defendant ought not
be viewed with distrust simply because it is given by a defendant" and that accomplice
testimony ought to be viewed with distrust: "Under the law, a defendant is surely equal to
all other witnesses. But, under the same law, he is superior to none.").5
Moreover, as defense counsel's opening and closing arguments make clear, the
instructions as a whole were—contrary to defendant's contention, see Aplt. Br. at
32—more than adequate to protect defendant's "right to present his defense" that Olive's
testimony should be considered with caution. See R. 454:128 (asserting that none of the
State's witnesses will be credible, noting, "They all have self-serving goals, Silia Olive
included"; "It will not surprise you t h a t . . . she will disclaim culpability"); R. 459:104445 (asserting that jurors have heard "a very confusing, contradictory hodgepodge of selfserving stories from uncredible drug addicted criminals eager to keep from being
suspects. .. . They were contradicting everything, and Lia more—at least as much as
everybody else").

5

In fact, to the extent jurisdictions take issue with jury instructions directed at codefendants, their difficulty appears to be more with accomplice-type instructions than
with the like-any-other-witness instruction given here. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 403 So.
2d 585, 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that "accomplice instruction is not
appropriate where defense testimony has been given . . . by one of two defendants tried
jointly" because "doubt and suspicion are improperly cast upon one defendant's
exculpatory testimony on his own"); State v. Okumura, 894 P.2d 80, 105 (Haw. 1995);
State v. Land, 794 P.2d 668, 671 (Kan. App. 1990); People v. Reed, 556 N.W.2d 858, 862
(Mich. 1996); but see People v. Box, 5 P.3d 130, 167 (Cal. 2000).
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Because the instructions as a whole were adequate for defendant to present his
defense, defendant's ineffectiveness claim based on them fails.
IV,

DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM ASSERTING
ERROR IN THE CAUSATION INSTRUCTION FAILS WHERE
DEFENDANT NEVER ARGUED THAT AN INTERVENING CAUSE
LED TO THE VICTIM'S DEATH
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in not challenging the murder

causation instruction. See Aplt. Br. at 35-39. Defendant contends the instruction "was
deficient, because it failed to define or otherwise inform the jury about the concept of
intervening cause." Id. at 36. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
"It is . . . axiomatic that where the defendant [asserts] a defense to . . . [a] criminal
charge, and where there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to support i t , . . . the jury
should be charged regarding it.55 State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 34-35 (Utah 1981).
However, "[wjhere .. . there is no reasonable basis in the evidence to support the defense
or its essential components, it is not error for the trial judge to either refuse to instruct the
jury as to the defense, or to instruct them to disregard it." Id. at 34; see also State v.
Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980).
In this case, Instruction 41 provided that, to find defendant guilty of murder, the
jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant "caused the death of Amy
Tavey" (R. 379). Instruction 43 then defined the phrase "[cjaused the death of another":
"Caused the death of another" means the death of the victim
resulted proximately from some act or omission on the part of the
defendant.
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The proximate cause of an injury or death is that cause, which
in a natural and continuous sequence, and which is unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one
that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the
injury.
One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to
have caused the death of another if the injury contributes
immediately or mediately to the death of such other.
It is not indispensable to a conviction that the wounds
inflicted by the actor be fatal and the direct cause of death. It is
sufficient that they cause death indirectly through a chain of natural
effects and causes unchanged by human action. The fact that other
causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of
responsibility, provided such other causes are not the sole proximate
cause of the death
(R. 381; Instr. 43) (emphasis added).
Defendant challenges Instruction 43, claiming that it was improper in light of the
instructions approved of in State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479 (Utah 1984). See Aplt. Br. at
37,47. In Lawson, defendant was convicted of automobile homicide and driving under
the influence causing bodily injury. On appeal, Lawson claimed that the jury instructions
on comparable negligence and intervening cause were confusing because they "required
[the] jury not to consider the court's instruction on proximate cause." Lawson, 688 P.2d
at 482. The supreme court's analysis of Lawson's claim consisted of one paragraph in
which the court concluded that the instructions given, including the instruction
"advis[ing] the jury of the concept of intervening cause," "adequately set forth the state of
the law as it applies to this case." Id.
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In his brief, defendant implies that Lawson defined the "appropriate" intervening
cause instruction that must be given "when causation is at issue in a criminal case." Aplt.
Br. at 37, 47. However, Lawson did not, in fact, mandate that any specific intervening
cause instruction be given in every case. Thus, Lawson does not support defendant's
ineffective assistance claim.
In any case, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the lack of a more
exact intervening cause instruction. Defendant's defense at trial was not—as defendant
now suggests, see Aplt. Br. at 38-39—that, although he took Amy from the car on the
night she died, another person unforeseeably came upon them afterwards and killed Amy.
Rather, his defense was that somebody else took Amy from the car and killed her. The
first defense implicates an intervening cause that saves defendant from liability despite an
initial wrongful act by him. The second does not. Because the second does not and
because it is the second defense that defendant pursued at trial, defense counsel had no
reason to object to the causation instruction given.
Furthermore, the instruction given did not, as defendant claims, allow the jury to
convict defendant of murder based "on the jurors' incorrect belief that his taking her from
the car was enough to convict him of the murder." Aplt. Br. at 39. First, the instruction
defines a proximate cause as "that cause, which in a natural and continuous sequence, and
which is unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred" (R. 381). Merely removing Amy from a car
and leading her off does not rise to the level of a proximate cause under this definition
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because no reasonable jury would believe that, "in a natural and continuous sequence,"
such an act would "produce the injury," i.e. Amy's death.
Second, the remainder of the instruction informs the jury that the proximate cause
must be a cause that actually "inflicts" an injury on the victim (R. 381). Thus, the
instruction explains, "[o]ne who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to have
caused the death of another if the injury contributes immediately or mediately to the death
of such other." And it explains that "[i]t is not indispensable to a conviction that the
wounds inflicted by the actor be fatal and the direct cause of death" if they "cause death
indirectly through a chain of natural effects and causes unchanged by human action" (Id.).
Again, merely removing Amy from a car and leading her off would not constitute
proximate cause under these explanations because neither action inflicted wounds upon
Amy. Rather, some additional human action—in this case, gun shots—was required to
cause Amy's death. Thus, this instruction did not allow conviction of defendant for
murder even if "the jurors had a reasonable doubt about whether one of the other people
involved unexpectedly opted to kill Tavey." Aplt. Br. at 39.
Finally, the instruction in this case was more favorable to defendant than the
instruction given in Lawson. By focusing on the infliction of an actual wound on Amy,
the causation instruction given here presumes that the initial wrongful act at issue was the
shooting of Amy. Thus, if defendant did not shoot Amy, he could not be held liable for
her death under this instruction.
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In contrast, the Lawson instruction defines a much broader spectrum of events
from which to consider proximate cause. For example, the Lawson instruction would
have allowed the jury to find proximate cause based on negligence, whether or not such
conduct directly caused Amy's injury or death. See Aplt. Br. at 37 (quoting "intervening
cause instruction approved of in the Lawson negligent homicide case"). Thus, arguably,
the Lawson instruction—unlike the one actually given—would have allowed the jury to
commence its analysis with defendant's taking Amy out of the car.
Second, the Lawson provides that for another human act to constitute an
independent intervening act, the second person could not be "a party to this case," nor
could the defendant "have [reasonably] anticipated" the other person's act "in the exercise
of ordinary care." See id. Here, defendant's defense was that another member of his
group killed Amy during the same criminal episode in which defendant had earlier
participated. Thus, the second person upon whom defendant's defense rested was clearly
"a party to this case" and one whose actions defendant could have reasonably anticipated.
Therefore, under the facts of this case, a Lawson-type instruction would have
increased the likelihood—not decreased it, as defendant contends—that the jury would
have convicted defendant of murder even had "one of the other people involved . . . opted
to kill Tavey." Aplt. Br. at 39.
Because defendant has not shown that the causation instruction given in this case
was inadequate, let alone erroneous, defendant has also not shown that his counsel was
ineffective in not challenging the instruction.
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V.

DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM ASSERTING
ERROR IN THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTION FAILS WHERE
COUNSEL HAD A STRATEGIC REASON FOR NOT
CHALLENGING IT
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in not challenging the jury's

flight instruction where that instruction did not advise the jury '"that (1) there may be
reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence, and (2) even if consciousness of guilt is
inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged.'" .
Aplt. Br. at 40 (quoting State v. Howell, 761 P.2d 579, 580 n.l (Utah App. 1988) (citing
State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983)). Because defense counsel had a strategic
reason for not challenging the instruction, however, defendant's claim fails.
As previously stated, to demonstrate counsel ineffectiveness, a defendant must
show both that his counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment and that counsel's performance prejudiced
him. See State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, \ 14, 34 P.3d 187.
In assessing whether trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonable professional judgment, this Court "must keep in mind 'the variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding
how best to represent a criminal defendant.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah
1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)); see also Parsons v.
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994). Because this Court "give[s] trial counsel wide
latitude in making tactical decisions," this Court "will not question such decisions unless
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there is no reasonable basis supporting them." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah
1996) (quoting Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)) (emphasis added).
Thus, to succeed on a claim that trial counsel performed deficiently, defendant
must "rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19, 12 P.3d
92 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Stated otherwise, a claim that
counsel performed deficiently must rest on more than mere failure to object when counsel
has a basis to do so. Defendant must also show that counsel's decision not to object had
"no reasonable basis supporting [it]." Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644 (citation omitted); see also
State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, ^ 40-44, 48 P.3d 931 (holding failure to object to
objectionable evidence was not deficient performance where omission was part of trial
strategy); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989) (same); State v. Bloomfield,
2003 UT App 3, f 31, 63 P.3d 110 (same); State v. Villarreal 857 P.2d 949, 955-56 (Utah
App. 1993) (same), affdby 889 P.2d 419, 427 (Utah 1995).
"Flight instructions are proper when supported by the evidence." State v. Riggs,
1999 UT App 271, K 9, 987 P.2d 1281; see also State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah
1983). However, to be complete, a flight instruction must also include the following two
admonitions: "that there may be reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence and that
even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual
guilt of the crime charged." Bales, 675 P.2d at 575; see also State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d
34, 39 (Utah 1987); State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 n.l (Utah App. 1988).
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In this case, the flight instruction did not specifically include either of the
admonitions discussed in Bales, 675 P.2d at 576 (R.

; Instr. 12). However, such

omission does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to object
to the omission unless defendant can also show that counsel had no strategic reason for
not objecting. See, e.g., Pecht, 2002 UT 41,ffif40-44; Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, f 31.
Absent such a showing, defendant has not rebutted the "strong presumption that under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at ^f 19 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant does not and cannot make that showing here.
First, nothing in the record suggests that defendant had an innocent motive for
going to Las Vegas after the crimes in this case were committed. To the contrary, as
defendant's counsel acknowledges in closing argument, the evidence does suggest that
defendant was guilty of at least some crimes during the episode (R. 459:1061 (suggesting
defendant should possibly "be charged with obstruction of justice or tampering with
evidence" for role in disposing of Boss's car; also conceding that "[i]f he assaulted Keith
at any time, that's wrong")). Given this evidence and defendant's concession on appeal
that his flight "showed his desire to avoid arrest," Aplt. Br. at 49, defendant's trial
counsel may have reasonably concluded that he had no evidentiary basis upon which to
argue—and therefore no reason to request an instruction providing—that "there may be
reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence." Bales, 675 P.2d at 575.
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Second, the flight instruction given in this case directed the jury both (1) to
"consider the motive which prompted th[e] flight, if any is shown" in determining
significance of the evidence of flight; and (2) that any "inference which may be drawn
from such flight, as to its strength and weakness, depends upon the facts and
circumstance surrounding the defendant at the time59 (R. 348; Instr. 12). Defense counsel
may have reasonably concluded that, although not setting forth the second Bales
requirements verbatim, the instruction was nonetheless sufficient to allow counsel to
argue that defendant's fleeing to Las Vegas reflected only a consciousness of guilt for
some—not all—of the crimes charged.
In any case, defendant cannot show he was prejudiced by counsel's decision, even
if it was deficient, because the evidence of defendant's guilt was substantial. First,
numerous witnesses—including a relative stranger, Kelli Kershaw—testified as to
defendant's participation in the crimes for which he was convicted (R. 454:157-58, 16869, 175, 179, 214, 219; R. 455:303, 310, 375-81, 383, 386-88, 411, 477, 481-84; R. 456:
540, 565-71, 573, 577-78, 602, 643, 649-53, 656; R. 457:823, 842, 844-45, 853, 872, 885,
887-89). Second, defendant's friend Loleni Tuaone testified that, the day after the
murder, defendant admitted shooting a woman and then rolling her into the river (R.
456:612, 614-16). Finally, after defendant was arrested in Las Vegas, he admitted to
police that he had assaulted Boss, taped Boss up and put Boss in the trunk of Boss's car
(R. 456:643, 650-53, 656). He also admitted being near the Jordan River that night (R.
456:643, 650-53). Against this evidence, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced
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by the flight instruction, even if the instruction was not as complete as it could have been.
Thus, defendant also cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object
to the instruction, even if such failure constituted deficient performance.
Consequently, defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails.6
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT MAKING FINDINGS
CONCERNING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES BEFORE
IMPOSING THE MAXIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE FOR
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING WHERE THE RECORD SUPPORTS
THE COURT'S LACK OF FINDINGS
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error when it failed to find

defendant's age and the existence of strong family support as mitigating factors before
sentencing defendant to the maximum minimum mandatory sentence for aggravated
kidnapping. Aplt. Br. at 43-44, 49. Alternatively, defendant claims his counsel was
ineffective in not objecting to the lack of such findings. See Aplt. Br. at 2, 44.
Defendant's claims fail because the record supports both the trial court's and counsel's
decisions.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(7) (West 2004) governs the imposition of minimum
mandatory sentences. Under that statute, a defendant convicted of a crime which carries
with it minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment "shall" be sentenced to "the term of
middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(7)(a). "In determining whether there are circumstances that
6

Because defendant has not shown any errors in the jury instructions given, he also
necessarily has not shown that "the erroneous jury instructions require a new trial"
"[u]nder the cumulative error doctrine." Aplt. Br. at 40 & n. 13. See
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justify imposition of the highest or lowest term," the court may consider the record in the
case, pre-sentence investigation and other similar reports, statements presented by the
prosecution or the defendant, "and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing
hearing." Id. § 76-3-20l(7)(c). In addition, the court "shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the
Sentencing Commission." Id. § 76-3-20 l(7)(e). "The court shall [then] set forth on the
record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower term." Id. § 763-201(7)(d).
Under the plain language of the statute, a trial court is not required to make
specific findings identifying the mitigating and aggravating factors considered. See id.
However, case law has imposed such a requirement. Thus, ",[t]o impose the greater or
lesser mandatory minimum sentence, the trial court must (1) identify the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances and (2) state the reasons for whichever minimum mandatory
sentence is imposed." State v. Simmons, 2000 UT App 190, ^ 19, 5 P.3d 1228 (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
"Concomitantly, any mitigating or aggravating circumstance found by the trial
court must be supported by evidence, and the proponent of the circumstance bears the
burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Moreno,
2005 UT App 200, f 13, 113 P.3d 992. "A mitigating factor is proven when the evidence
is substantial, uncontradicted, and there is no reason to doubt its credibility." State v.
Kemp, 569 S.E.2d 717, 723 (N.C. App. 2002) (citations, internal quotation marks, and
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alterations omitted). "One witness' conclusory testimony as to the existence of a
[mitigating factor] is unsubstantial and insufficient to clearly establish the factor and does
not compel a finding of the mitigating factor." Kemp, 569 S.E.2d at 723.
A.

Defendant's plain error claim fails where the evidence supports
the trial court's lack of findings.

Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in sentencing him to the
maximum minimum mandatory term for aggravated kidnapping when it failed to find "as
mitigating circumstances that [defendant'] has strong family support and is young." Aplt.
Br. at 42, 43, 49. Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court's failure to make the necessary
findings with regard to mitigating factors, and failure to weight the aggravating and
mitigating factors prior to selecting the maximum term of fifteen years to life, require
resentencing." Aplt. Br. at 42. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
To establish plain error, defendant must show that (1) the trial court erred; (2) the
error should have been obvious; and (3) the error was prejudicial. See State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (1993). Defendant cannot show error, let alone obvious error, here.
First, in arguing that the trial court should have found his age a mitigating factor,
defendant relies on State v. Strung 846 P.2d 1297(Utah 1993). See Aplt. Br. at 42-43.
Defendant, however, is not Strunk.
In Strunk, the defendant was a sixteen-year-old with no criminal past. Strunk, 846
P.2d at 1300. In contrast, defendant was twenty years old at the time he committed these
crimes. In addition, defendant had an extensive juvenile record—including a prior
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adjudication for aggravated robbery and several parole violations—as well as a theft
conviction as an adult. Finally, defendant was described by his parole officer as "a
dangerous young man [who] should go to prison for life" (R. 446:PSI at 1, 7-8, 9).
As this Court stated in State v. Moreno, age "should be considered as mitigating
when a defendant is very young and unsophisticated." State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App
200, Tf 14, 113 P.3d 992. Defendant here, unlike Strunk, was neither very young nor
unsophisticated. Therefore, the trial court did not err, let alone obviously err, under
Strunk, in not finding defendant's age a mitigating factor.
Alternatively, defendant claims that the trial court obviously erred in not finding
defendant's familial support as a mitigating factor. Again, however, the record defeats
defendant's claim. The only evidence concerning defendant's family support consisted of
defendant's own statement to the presentence investigator that "all members of his family
are saddened by his present circumstances, but remain loving and supportive of him" (R.
446:PSI at 113). A trial court need not make findings favorable to a defendant based
solely on that defendant's self-serving statements. See Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, \ 14.
Moreover, defendant's statement of familial support is contradicted by additional
facts set forth in the very same paragraph of defendant's PSI—that "[n]o letters were
received on the defendant's behalf and that "attempts to contact his mother and older
brother were unsuccessful, as the number provided by the defendant has been
disconnected" (R. 446:PSI at 113). Where, as here, the record concerning the factor is
"subject to some dispute," a "trial court act[s] well within its discretion in discounting or
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ignoring [alleged mitigation evidence] and in not accepting them as mitigating
circumstances for its sentencing decision." Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, f 17.
Based on this record, then, defendant cannot show error, let alone obvious error, in
the trial court's decision not to find defendant's age and alleged familial support as
mitigating factors.
B.

Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails where the record supports
counsel's decision.

Alternatively, defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in not objecting to
the trial court's decision not to find defendant's age and his alleged familial support as
mitigating factors. See Aplt. Br. at 49. However, where, as here, the record does not
support such findings, see pp. 47-48 supra, defendant has not overcome the strong
presumption that counsel's decision was a sound strategic one. See Litherland, 2000 UT
76, \ 19. Therefore, defendant's claim fails.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals,
2005 UT 18, Tf 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557,
560 (Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided
by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED M_ September 2005
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Utah Attorney General^.
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Addendum A

United States Const, Amend. VI
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.

Utah Const, Art. I, § 12
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

